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Introduction
"Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly. "I
t Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., The Yale Law
School, 1993; B.A., Harvard College, 1988. Copyright © 2007 by L. Song Richardson.
The author is grateful to Michele Goodwin, Cynthia Roseberry, and Emily Hughes for
their invaluable comments when reviewing this article and to Zach Bowles for useful
research assistance. Finally, the author thanks Dean Glen Weissenberger for providing
the resources that made this article possible and the editors of the Cornell International
Law Journal for their valuable assistance. Any errors are my own.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
41 CORNELL INT' L.J. 347 (2008)
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The adjudication of transnational criminal cases in the United States
raises troubling questions about the government's commitment to the
venerable due process values of fairness and reliability. Consider this sce-
nario: Mr. Smith is arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer in
the United States. At trial, Mr. Smith intends to argue that he was acting in
self-defense. All witnesses to the incident live in the United States and,
therefore, are subject to the court's subpoena power. Mr. Smith subpoenas
two eyewitnesses who testify that the officer started the fight. The prosecu-
tor subpoenas one witness who testifies that Mr. Smith started the fight. At
trial, the jury hears the testimony of all three witnesses before reaching a
verdict. This scenario illustrates typical compulsory process in domestic
criminal prosecutions in the United States.
Now consider an alternative scenario: Mr. Smith is arrested and
charged with assaulting a police officer in the United States. At trial, he
intends to argue that he acted in self-defense. This time, all of the eyewit-
nesses are Canadian citizens who return to Canada shortly after the inci-
dent. Because these witnesses are located outside the United States and are
not U.S. citizens, they are not subject to the court's subpoena power. 2 This
presents no problem for the prosecutor; she simply relies upon the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the United States and Canada to
compel the testimony of her witness. Mr. Smith, however, cannot use the
MLAT because its language prevents defendants from employing it. When
Mr. Smith asks the prosecutor to use the MLAT to compel the testimony of
his witnesses, she refuses. At trial, the jury hears only the testimony of the
prosecutor's witness before reaching a verdict. This example illustrates typ-
ical transnational compulsory process in the United States when an MLAT
exists.
3
Both scenarios involve the same facts, the same defendant, and the
same witnesses. The only difference is that the first scenario is a domestic
prosecution in which both parties have access to compulsory process and
the second scenario is a transnational prosecution. 4 When an applicable
MLAT exists, only the prosecutor has access to process. The disparity in
access to process in transnational cases exists not by chance, but by
design. The United States intentionally created this disparity when it nego-
tiated the inclusion of language barring defendants' access to their compul-
sory process provisions in MLATs.5
Over forty years ago, in his seminal work on the criminal process in
the United States, Herbert Packer described two models of criminal proce-
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (2006) gives U.S. courts the power to issue a subpoena to U.S.
residents or nationals living abroad, ordering the subject to appear, to produce docu-
ments, or both for proceedings in the United States.
3. ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops ACROss BORDERs: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S.
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 352-54, 379-80 (1993).
4. The term "transnational" in this article refers to cases that are tried in the United
States but which require evidence from a foreign locale.
5. See NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 381; Robert Neale Lyman, Compulsory Process in
a Globalized Era: Defendant Access to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, 47 VA. J. INT'L L.
261, 288-89 (2006).
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dure: the crime control model and the due process model.6 As its name
suggests, the crime control model posits that the most important function
of the criminal justice system is to effectively suppress crime.7 This model
values efficiency in catching and prosecuting law-breakers. 8 The due pro-
cess model, in contrast, focuses on the fallibility of the criminal process. 9
Its primary concerns are fairness and reliability, as opposed to effi-
ciency. 10 Accordingly, the due process model focuses on limiting the
power of the state vis-A-vis the individual. 1
Balancing the norms of these two models of the criminal process is
often challenging. The current doctrine in domestic criminal cases
attempts to balance the fairness and legitimacy norms of the due process
model against the competing norms of effective and efficient crime control
of the crime control model.' 2 Although vigorous debate exists over the
appropriateness of the current balancing scheme, 13 its well-established and
familiar principles provide defendants in purely domestic cases with rights
of access to important evidence necessary to lend legitimacy to the crimi-
nal process.
No such balance exists in the increasingly common transnational
criminal case tried in U.S. courts. 14 In the global crime era, purely domes-
tic cases are no longer the norm; instead, necessary evidence often is
located in foreign jurisdictions. In these transnational cases, the unbal-
anced MLATs demonstrate that crime control norms usurp the values of
due process, resulting in a transnational criminal process that inadequately
protects fairness and legitimacy norms.
Concern about transnational prosecutions is not new. Prior critiques,
however, stop short of creating a framework that will create consistent
compulsory process rights in U.S. prosecutions, whether transnational or
domestic.' 5 This failure may be due, in part, to the fact that transnational
adjudications raise foreign policy concerns that complicate the application
of traditional domestic due process principles.
This article proposes a transnational due process model that mini-
mizes foreign policy concerns by preserving the efficacy of MLATs. The
model primarily focuses on the duties that the U.S. Constitution imposes
on prosecutors. It conceives a role for prosecutors in transnational cases
that is faithful to their responsibility to act both as "truth" seekers and law
6. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-6
(1964).
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 14-15.
10. Id. at 15-16.
11. Id. at 16.
12. Id. at 5-6.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See Lyman, supra note 5, at 262.
15. See, e.g., MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RiSTAU, OBTAINING EviDENCE 84-90 (1997);
Lyman, supra note 5, at 262; Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement:
Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 307 (2002).
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enforcers, and introduces fairness and legitimacy into the transnational
criminal process.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the current transna-
tional criminal process, focusing on its evidentiary method. It charts the
evolution of MLATs as an important solution to the inadequate foreign evi-
dence-gathering mechanisms that exist in their absence. For purposes of
crime control, MLATs are effective, efficient, and indispensable tools for
resolving global crime. Scrutinizing MLATs through the lens of due pro-
cess, however, demonstrates that their evidence-gathering mechanisms are
flawed. The current operation of MLATs reveals the ascendancy of the
crime control model, as well as the relative absence of due process norms,
in transnational criminal cases.
Part 11 takes a step back and explores the fundamental principles of
the domestic due process model governing the duties of prosecutors. Sub-
part A examines prosecutors' constitutionally mandated dual role in the
criminal justice system as aggressive advocates and as "ministers of jus-
tice." Subpart B then analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's "access to evi-
dence" jurisprudence. These cases demonstrate how the Court balances
the competing values of crime control and due process in purely domestic
criminal cases in order to ensure defense access to important evidence.
Building upon the domestic framework, Part III proposes a transna-
tional criminal process framework that incorporates due process norms.
By focusing on the role of the prosecutor, the proposed approach brings
fairness and legitimacy to transnational criminal adjudications while con-
comitantly maintaining effective means of crime control. This Part then
applies the framework to determine how it would resolve the flawed evi-
dentiary method that MLATs currently impose. It ends by identifying
some of the benefits and limitations of the proposal, including potential
foreign policy concerns. Finally, this article concludes by suggesting that
courts adopt the framework in order to ensure that existing MLATs operate
in a manner that provides for the effective prosecution of transnational law-
breakers while protecting fundamental due process principles.
1. Evolution of MLATs
Prior to the advent of MLATs, parties that needed foreign evidence had
two options: (1) informal methods, such as cooperation and unilateral
actions and (2) letters rogatory, a more formal diplomatic process. 16
Although MLATs provide prosecutors with an alternative means to obtain
foreign evidence, these two options remain the only means available for
defendants to request such evidence. Prosecutors still use these options to
request foreign evidence when an MLAT does not exist. 17 Subparts A and
B will discuss these options. Subpart C then explains the development and
role of MLATs.
16. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 318.
17. Lyman, supra note 5, at 272-78.
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A. Informal Methods
One informal method that American law enforcement officials use to
gather evidence is cooperation with their foreign counterparts. By develop-
ing close working relationships, law enforcement officials can conduct
investigations and obtain evidence below the radar of high-level govern-
ment officials. When cooperation is not possible, however, the United
States often resorts to unilateral actions to obtain evidence needed to pros-
ecute. For example, one popular technique designed to pressure uncooper-
ative nations to succumb to U.S. law enforcement demands is to serve
subpoenas on foreign companies operating in the United States for records
held by their foreign branches. 18 If the corporation fails to respond, the
U.S. court that issued the subpoena will then hold the corporation in civil
contempt until it produces the requested records. 19 Another form of uni-
lateral action is the "Ghidoni waiver" in which U.S. courts order the target
of a grand jury investigation to sign a consent form waiving any bank
secrecy privilege .20 Finally, in extreme cases, U.S. officials have resorted to
bribing foreign officials2 1 and abducting foreign nationals.2 2 Rather than
promoting international cooperation, these unilateral acts predictably lead
to international friction.
2 3
Defendants also have informal methods for obtaining foreign evi-
dence, but these options are limited because they cannot form cooperative
arrangements with foreign law enforcement or take advantage of diplo-
matic pressures that can facilitate informal cooperation. Essentially,
defendants can obtain their own records from foreign institutions, hire pri-
vate investigators if they have sufficient funds, or resort to bribery or other
corrupt means. For both parties, these informal mechanisms for gathering
evidence fall short of ensuring access to important evidence located
outside the United States.
B. Letters Rogatory
The primary formal method that defendants and prosecutors use to
obtain evidence in the absence of an MLAT is the discretionary diplomatic
process called letters rogatory. 24 In the rogatory procedure, parties seek-
ing foreign evidence ask domestic courts to send a diplomatic request for
evidence to a foreign tribunal. 25 The foreign tribunal is under no obliga-
18. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 316.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
20. See United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1984); NADELMANN, supra
note 3, at 363-64.
21. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 325 n.19.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
23. See, e.g., NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 359-60. For example, international ten-
sions arose between the United States and the United Kingdom when prosecutors began
serving subpoenas upon local branches of multinational corporations. See id. In order
to relieve the tension, the Justice Department ordered that all subpoenas to institutions
in the United States for records located abroad be cleared through the department. Id.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (2006).
25. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 318.
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tion to honor the request.26 If a foreign court chooses to respond, the
requested evidence often arrives long after the trial is complete. 27 Even if
the evidence arrives promptly, it frequently does not comply with domestic
rules of evidence. 2 8 Accordingly, parties utilizing letters rogatory must
simply cross their fingers and hope that the foreign nation will provide the
evidence in a timely fashion and in an admissible form. Historically, the
absence of a reliable evidence-gathering mechanism often stymied
prosecutorial efforts,2 9 making it not unusual for the U.S. government to
simply forgo transnational prosecutions. As the global crime problem
worsened, prosecutors worked hard to develop a solution. 30 MLATs were
the answer. 3 1
C. MLATs
MLATs are bilateral treaties that obligate each signatory to transmit
evidence located within its borders to the other signatory state. 3 2 They
address the many shortcomings of the letters rogatory process. First, when
a proper request is made, the signatories must provide the requested evi-
dence unless an explicit provision of the treaty permits denial. 33 Second,
requests are made and received through designated "central authorities"
26. See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, at 87.
27. It is not uncommon for evidence to arrive six months or more after a request is
made. See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY CONCERN-
ING THE CAYMAN ISLANDS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-8, at 166 (1st Sess. 1989) [hereinafter
CAYMAN ISLANDS REPORT] (statement of Robert L. Pisani, Executive Director of Interna-
tional Legal Defense Counsel).
28. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 319.
29. See id. at 345-75 (discussing the numerous reasons for negotiating the treaties,
including the difficulty of obtaining evidence necessary for prosecutions). In a letter to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary for Legisla-
tive Affairs, wrote, "The treaties are very important to U.S. law enforcement interests,
especially in obtaining convictions against international narcotics traffickers, terrorists,
and other international criminals." CAYMAN ISLANDS REPORT, supra note 27, at 217.
30. See NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 317.
31. The United States negotiated MLATs to address the growing global crime prob-
lem. An official from the Department of Justice explained:
[Tihe negotiation and implementation of effective mutual legal assistance trea-
ties and executive agreements is a very important aspect of our effort to investi-
gate and prosecute serious crime. As this Committee knows all too well, we have
in recent years seen the internationalization of serious crimes such as narcotics
trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and large scale fraud.
CAYMAN ISLANDS REPORT, supra note 27, at 94 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
32. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 315.
33. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATY WITH AUSTRIA ON MUTUAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 104-24, at 4 (2d Sess. 1996) [herein-
after AUSTRIA REPORT] ("Mutual legal assistance treaties generally impose reciprocal obli-
gations on parties to cooperate both in the investigation and the prosecution of crime.").
Explicit provisions permitting denial are usually set forth in Article III of the treaties.
See, e.g., id. at 4, 15. For example, a nation can refuse to respond to a request if the
request appears to involve military or political offenses not recognized under the crimi-
nal laws of the requested state. Id. at 5, 15.
Vol. 41
2008 Due Process for the Global Crime Age
from each country. 34 The central authority for the United States is the
Office of International Affairs, which is housed within the Department of
Justice. 35 As central authorities work together to facilitate evidentiary
requests, countries become more familiar with their differing legal systems
and as a result, the procedure becomes more efficient. 3 6 In addition, the
signatories must provide evidence in a form admissible in the requesting
nation's courts. 37 In sum, MLATs facilitate transnational prosecutions by
creating a mandatory, reliable, and efficient means to obtain foreign evi-
dence in a timely fashion and in an admissible form. 3 8 They create a com-
pulsory transnational process for prosecutors similar to domestic
subpoenas.3 9
34. The central authority for the United States is the Attorney General or his or her
designee. Id. at 14.
35. The Attorney General designated the Office of International Affairs, located in
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, as the central authority for the
United States. 28 C.F.R. § 0.64-1 (2007). Every federal prosecutor's office in the coun-
try has an "international security coordinator" who is responsible for handling requests
to or from foreign nations. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL
§ 9-90.050 (2004).
36. David Stoelting et al., U.S. Multilateral Enforcement of International Criminal
Law, 36 INT'L LAW. 569, 571 (2002).
37. Procedures are set forth in the treaty to ensure that the evidence provided will be
in an admissible form. See, e.g., AUSTRIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 22 (setting forth
procedures to ensure that business records are authenticated in a manner acceptable in
U.S. courts).
38. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M. Richard stated:
It has been increasingly common that significant evidence in major criminal
cases will be found abroad. Obtaining such evidence, particularly in a form that
will be admissible in our courts, has not been an easy matter. The purpose of
our MLAT's is to provide a reliable and efficient means of obtaining this
evidence.
CAYMAN ISLANDS REPORT, supra note 27, at 61 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
39. Although the government argues that MLATs do not provide the government
with transnational compulsory process and, therefore, "there is nothing that the defense
is being denied," AUSTRIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 10-11, this statement is disingenu-
ous at best. It contradicts testimony of executive branch officials before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee. For example, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M.
Richard stated that "an MLAT obligates each country to provide evidence and other forms
of assistance needed in criminal cases." CAYMAN ISLANDS REPORT, supra note 27, at 95
(statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Depart-
ment of Justice) (emphasis added). MLATs obligate assistance by compelling the testi-
mony of witnesses needed by a foreign jurisdiction. The country receiving the request
can either ask the witness to travel voluntarily or compel the witness to submit to a
deposition. See, e.g., AUSTRIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 21. When a witness is in cus-
tody, the treaties provide for the transfer of that witness if the witness consents and the
central authorities of both nations consent. Id. at 25. The treaties also compel the wit-
ness to appear with any requested documents. Id. at 26. For example, Article 8 of the
US-Austria MLAT obligates the requested state to compel persons to appear and testify
or produce evidence requested by the requesting state. Treaty with Austria on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Austria, Feb. 23, 1995, S. TREATY Doc. No.
104-21 (1995). Judicial authorities of both contracting parties have the power to compel
testimony or documents from individuals or companies in connection with both domes-
tic and foreign proceedings. AUSTRIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 21. A similar provision in
the United States-Mexico MLAT states, in Article 7:
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The United States completed its first MLAT with Switzerland in
1973.40 State, Justice, and Treasury Department officials were part of the
U.S. negotiating team.4 1 The negotiations were delicate and politically sen-
sitive, in part because MLATs require accommodation of different legal sys-
tems, customs, and cultures. 42 Decisions had to be made regarding how to
deal with the fact that nations criminalize different acts, have different legal
traditions (civil versus common law), use different evidence-gathering
mechanisms, and understand appropriate law enforcement behavior differ-
ently.43 MLATs had to overcome these obstacles. The negotiation of the
Swiss MLAT taught U.S. negotiators important lessons that helped them
craft future MLATs more efficiently. Importantly, from an international
relations perspective, MLATs are important because they demonstrate the
United States' willingness to work cooperatively with other nations to
reduce global crime.
4 4
In the first federal prosecution utilizing the Swiss MLAT, 45 the defen-
dant blindsided prosecutors when he asked them to use the treaty to obtain
evidence for him from Switzerland. The trial judge, finding no language in
the treaty barring such use, ordered the Department of Justice to use the
MLAT to obtain the evidence. 46 After this experience, the government had
to choose whether to continue to negotiate MLATs that also allow defend-
ants to gather foreign evidence or to ensure that future treaties would only
benefit prosecutors. The government chose the latter course: MLATs now
commonly contain language limiting their use to the government's exclu-
sive benefit.4 7 For example, the Canadian MLAT provides that it does not
A person in the requested State whose testimony is requested shall be compelled
by subpoena, if necessary, by the competent authority of the requested Party to
appear and testify or produce documents, records, and objects in the requested
State to the same extent as in criminal investigations or proceedings in that
State.
Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 9, 1987, S. TRFATY Doc.
No. 100-13 (1988). In the absence of an MLAT, the parties are left to hope that they
can obtain the deposition of a foreign witness through the discretionary and unreliable
letters rogatory process, or that they can convince the witness to voluntarily travel to the
foreign locale where his or her testimony is needed.
40. See Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973,
27 U.S.T. 2019.
41. NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 324.
42. Id. at 10 (describing harmonization as a concept that incorporates three
processes: the "regularization of relations among law enforcement officials of different
states, [the] accommodation among systems that retain their essential differences, and
[the] homogenization of systems toward a common norm").
43. See id. at 347. For example, techniques commonly used in the United States
such as wire-tapping and undercover operations are either forbidden or strictly con-
strained by other countries. Id. at 7, 209, 225-35, 239-46. Many civil law countries
require the prosecution of anyone known to have committed a crime. Id. at 216. This
"legality principle" prevents law enforcement from turning individuals into informants.
Id. at 216, 218-19.
44. See id. at 472.
45. See, e.g., ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, at §12-2-1(2) n.10.
46. Id.
47. The Canadian and Mexican MLATs provide that they "do not give rise to a right
on the part of a private party to obtain.., any evidence." See Treaty Between the United
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"give rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain ... any evi-
dence."'48 Similarly, the Thai MLAT provides that it is not intended to pro-
vide assistance to private parties,49 and the Italian MLAT states that the
treaty is intended "solely" for mutual assistance between the government
or law enforcement authorities of the contracting parties.5 0 Though each
treaty uses different language, the United States clearly intended these
instruments to eliminate defendants' access to compulsory transnational
process. 5 1 Currently, a defendant who requires foreign evidence must rely
solely on the discretionary, inefficient, and unpredictable letters rogatory
process.
52
From the standpoint of creating an effective tool to prosecute crimes,
the government's choice to exclude defendants from MLATs makes sense.
After all, criminal prosecutions are easier and more efficient when only the
government can compel evidence. Thus, MLATs are salutary when effec-
tive crime control is most highly valued. Nonetheless, the imbalance in
evidence-gathering tools raises serious and troubling questions about the
fairness, reliability, and legitimacy of the transnational criminal process. 5 3
States and Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Can., Mar. 18,
1985, 24 I.L.M. 1092; Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 9,
1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 (1988). The treaty with the Netherlands is the excep-
tion. See Treaty Between the United States and the Netherlands on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, With Exchange of Notes, U.S.-Neth., June 12, 1981, T.1.A.S. No.
10,734 ("A request to the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the production of documents
from private persons shall comply with this Article.").
48. Treaty Between the United States and Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Can., Mar. 18, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1092.
49. Treaty with Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Thail., Mar.
19, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-18 (1986).
50. Treaty Between the United States and the Italian Republic on Mutual Legal Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Italy, Nov. 9, 1982, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-25 (1983).
51. Arguably, the prosecution can still request defense evidence because the lan-
guage literally restricts the ability of private parties to directly utilize the treaty. How-
ever, prosecutors interpret the restrictive language as barring the central authority from
requesting evidence on behalf of defendants. For example, the former director of the
Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department ofJustice testified, "It was
the conception in the very beginning that these kinds of law enforcement tools would be
limited to the parties, the governments, the law enforcement authorities of each." CAY-
MAN ISLANDS REPORT, supra note 27, at 176 (statement of Philip T. White, Adams, McCul-
lough & Beard, Former Director of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).
52. On its website discussing the use of MLATs, the State Department expresses the
view that defendants must still utilize the letters rogatory process. See U.S. Dep't of
State, Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) and Other Agreements, http://www.travel.
state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial 690.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
53. When prosecutors utilize MLATs for their own benefit but exclude the defense,
this virtually ensures the conviction of an innocent person because the jury will reach its
verdict without the benefit of all of the evidence. A 1993 study found that a major factor
leading to the conviction of individuals later found to be factually innocent was
"prosecutorial zeal and bad faith." Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme
Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 311, 317 (1996) (citing Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction
and the Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 285-86 (1988)).
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As MLATs proliferate5 4 and the number of transnational prosecutions
grows, we must carefully consider whether the global crime problem justi-
fies the diminution of due process norms. On the one hand, effective
crime control requires giving the state the freedom and discretion to
enforce the law without allowing concerns over individual rights to para-
lyze it. On the other hand, history demonstrates that unfettered state
police power often leads to abuse.
55
The question of how to appropriately balance the competing norms of
crime control and individual rights is not unique to transnational criminal
cases. This question dominates much of domestic criminal process juris-
prudence, especially in relation to the role of the prosecutor. 56 The prose-
cutor's unique role in the criminal justice system reflects the tension
between the crime control and due process models. Prosecutors must bal-
ance their constitutionally mandated dual roles as aggressive advocates,
whose primary goal is to win convictions, and quasi-judicial officers,
whose primary concern is to ensure that the criminal process is fair and
legitimate.5 7
II. The Prosecutor's Duty to Provide Defense Access to Evidence
A. The Unique Role of Prosecutors
Prosecutors have a well-established and constitutionally-mandated
dual role in criminal cases. First, they are law enforcers; they must prose-
cute criminals aggressively due to the constitutional imperative to "take
care" that the laws are "faithfully executed."'5 8 In addition, the U.S. Consti-
tution requires prosecutors to temper their adversarial zeal and protect the
fairness and reliability of the criminal process.59
54. Currently, the United States has signed sixty-one MLATs. See U.S. Dep't of State,
supra note 52.
55. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2005) (discussing Sir Walter
Raleigh's trial in 1603 before the Privy Council in which he was not permitted to con-
front the witness against him before being sentenced to death).
56. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,
88 GEO. LJ. 207, 226-28 (2000).
57. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethical Standards Different?, 68 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1453, 1472 (2000) (noting prosecutors' dual role as advocate and minister
of justice); Richard Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 695 (1987) (arguing that prosecutors have a duty of
fairness).
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For a cogent discussion of the executive's role in enforc-
ing the law, see Gerald V. Bradley, Law Enforcement and the Separation of Powers, 30
ARIz. L. REV. 801, 803, 855-85 (1988).
59. As advocates, prosecutors, however, are not immune from the pressure and
desire to win. Many prosecutors' offices create incentives to win convictions. "[B]ecause
[a federal prosecutor's] success is measured by her conviction rate, she may be tempted
to ignore the rights of defendants, victims, or the community in order to obtain pleas or
guilty verdicts." Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 58-59 (1991). This focus often trans-
lates into prosecutors attempting to circumvent their minister of justice imperative. See,
e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 309,
351 (2001) (hereinafter Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth) ("A prosecutorial cul-
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Because they represent the sovereign, prosecutors have complex con-
stitutional and ethical obligations.60 Generally, defense lawyers are not
required to disclose evidence favorable to the prosecution's case or to
inform the government of their client's guilt.6 1 The U.S. Constitution 62
and the ethical rules only obligate defense attorneys to vigorously advocate
their client's cause. 63 In contrast, prosecutors are duty-bound to refrain
from allowing their role as advocates to eclipse their obligation to ensure
fair proceedings. 64 They are quasi-judicial officers who must ensure that
ture that advocates winning and maintains won-loss statistics not only discourages a
critical examination of truth but encourages misconduct as well."); Bennett L.
Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 133 (1986)
("Prosecutorial misconduct occurs so often because it works."); James S. Liebman, The
Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2129 (2000) (discussing how prose-
cutors operate under strong incentives to seek the death penalty); Abbe Smith, Can You
Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 388-89 (2001)
(discussing the difficulties prosecutors face in resisting institutional pressures).
60. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) ("The concept that the
government alone must honor constitutional dictates, however, is a fundamental tenet of
our legal order, not an obstacle to be circumvented. This is particularly so in the context
of criminal trials, where we have held the prosecution to uniquely high standards of
conduct."). Prosecutors have higher obligations. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public
Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Inter-
est?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789, 792 (2000) ("It has long been the view in American law that the
prosecutor's paramount duty is to serve justice, rather than to secure a conviction in a
given case."); Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 59, at 337; Bruce A.
Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 607, 636 (1999); H.
Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pur-
suit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2000); Zacharias, supra note 59, at 103-09;
Zacharias & Green, supra note 56, at 226-28.
61. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (1998) (noting that in certain circumstances,
defense lawyers must argue their client's perjured testimony); Gerald B. Lefcourt,
Responsibilities of a Criminal Defense Attorney, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 59, 60 (1996) (detail-
ing the sometimes difficult duty of defending clients zealously).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706
(1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel).
63. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, 4-1.2 (3d ed. 1993) (the function of defense counsel "is to serve as
the accused's counselor and advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective,
quality representation"); id. 4-4.1 (defense counsel's "duty to investigate exists regard-
less of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting
guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.3 cmt. [1] (2007) ("A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
opposition, obstruction, or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever law-
ful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal
in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); id. R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a crim-
inal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration,
may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case
be established.").
64. This duty is often difficult because the adversarial system tends to foster a "win
at all costs" mentality. For a comprehensive discussion of this mentality and culture, see
Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J.
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trials lead to reliable outcomes that are worthy of public confidence. 65
Hence, they are often referred to as "ministers of justice,"'66 reflecting their
special role seeking truth and justice in adversarial criminal trials.67 This
duty to truth is "the ultimate statement of [the government's] responsibility
to provide a fair trial under the Due Process Clause .... "68 The oft-quoted
passage by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sutherland describes the
prosecutor's unique dual role well:
CRiM. L. 197, 208-11 (1988); Smith, supra note 59, 388-89 (discussing institutional
pressures on prosecutors to win at all costs); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is
Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping
Mentality DoingJusticefor Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001). Former prosecu-
tors say that those in office are "driven to win by a complex blend of factors, including
appeasing the family of a victim, earning accolades of fellow prosecutors, and 'getting
the bad guy."' Felice F. Guerrieri, Law & Order: Redefining the Relationship Between
Prosecutors and Police, 25 S. ILL. U. LJ. 353, 376 (2001). However, the ethical rules are
clear when it comes to access to evidence. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 63, 3-3.11(a)
("A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at
the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(d) (2007) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense[.]"). In fact, these model rules and stan-
dards require more of the prosecution than the Due Process Clause. See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that due process "requires less of the prose-
cution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally for
prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate.").
65. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (noting that a prose-
cutor's "primary constitutional duty" is "to do justice in criminal prosecutions"); MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) ("The responsibility of a public prosecu-
tor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.").
66. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 11] (2007) ("A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); see
also AM. BAR AsS'N, supra note 63, 3-3.13 cmt. (the prosecutor must "strive not for 'court-
room victories' . . . but for results that best serve the overall interests of justice. "); id. 3-
1.2(c) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict;" the prosecu-
tor is obligated "to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the
rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public."); Lisa Kurcias, Prose-
cutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDI-AM L. REV. 1205, 1209-13 (2000)
(arguing that prosecutors are held to a higher standard than ordinary attorneys because
they represent the sovereign and society as a whole); McMunigal, supra note 57, at 1472
(arguing that the prosecutor's dual role as advocate and minister of justice strikes a
different balance between cooperative and adversarial stances); Rosen, supra note 57, at
695 (arguing that prosecutors have a duty of fairness).
67. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a prosecutor, "as the agent of the people and the State, has the unique duty to
ensure fundamentally fair trials by seeking not only to convict, but also to vindicate the
truth and to administer justice"); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,
648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the function of the prosecutor is
"not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall" but is to "give those accused
of crime a fair trial"); Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 59, at 313.
68. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696 (1985) (noting that the duty of truth is the
"essence of due process").
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The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty.., whose interest.., in a criminal prosecu-
tion is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . [H]e
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.6 9
One of the earliest cases recognizing the prosecutor's duty to truth is
Mooney v. Holohan.70 In Mooney, the prosecutor deceived the court and the
jury by deliberately using perjured testimony and then withholding evi-
dence that would have impeached that testimony in order to obtain a con-
viction.7 1 His acts created a sham trial that violated due process.
7 2
Although neither party should deliberately mislead the court through the
knowing use of perjured testimony, the prosecutor's actions in this
instance were particularly troubling because of his constitutional obliga-
tion to pursue justice.
Prosecutors' duty to fairness not only requires them to refrain from
acts that undermine the trial process but also imposes affirmative obliga-
tions. Prosecutors must comb through not only their own files, 73 but also
those of their entire office,7 4 the police department,7 5 and often non-law
enforcement agencies 76 for evidence favorable to the defense-evidence
that could affect the jury's verdict. 77 If prosecutors discover such evidence,
they must disclose it whether or not the defense specifically requests it.7 8
Due process requires these acts because prosecutors cannot be "archi-
tect[s] of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice. 7 9
69. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
70. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
71. Id. at 110.
72. Id. at 112-13 (criticizing the prosecution for "contriv[ing] a conviction through
the pretense of a trial"). Later cases also reiterate this principle. See, e.g., Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (holding that the prosecutor violated due process by failing
to correct false testimony); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.
213 (1942).
73. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963).
74. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In Giglio v. United States, the
prosecutor's failure to disclose impeachment evidence of a key prosecution witness vio-
lated due process. Id. at 154.
75. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 437 (1995) (holding that due process
requires the prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence known to "others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police").
76. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (holding that the defendant
was entitled to in camera review of confidential child abuse records for material
evidence).
77. See infra Part II.B.1 discussing the materiality standard.
78. In United States v. Agurs, the Court wrote, "[F]airness requires it to be disclosed
even without a specific request. For though the attorney for the sovereign must prose-
cute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client's
overriding interest that 'justice shall be done." 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
79. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (quoting from an inscription on
the walls of the Department of Justice).
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They must ensure that all material facts are aired in the courtroom.8 0 They
mislead the fact-finder when they suppress evidence favorable to the
defense as much as when they allow perjured testimony to go uncor-
rected.8 1 In sum, they have a constitutionally mandated duty to ensure
that trials result in verdicts worthy of public confidence.8 2
The prosecution's dual role in the criminal justice system embodies
the combined values of the crime control and due process models of crimi-
nal procedure. As law enforcers, prosecutors should vigorously and zeal-
ously prosecute law breakers, using every tool in their arsenal to obtain a
conviction. As quasi-judicial officers, they must temper that adversarial
posture in order to protect fairness and justice.8 3 Striking the appropriate
balance between these competing norms is often difficult.8 4 Subpart B
below analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's "access to evidence" jurispru-
80. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
81. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959).
82. "Unless, indeed, the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a gladiato-
rial level unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth, the govern-
ment simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence
has come to portend such an effect on a trial's outcome as to destroy confidence in its
result .... This is as it should be. Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the
prosecutor as 'the representative ... of a sovereignty ... ' Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (citing
Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
83. It is often difficult for prosecutors to live up to the high standards of conduct
required of them. In fact, prosecutors are often rewarded, or at least not punished, when
their misconduct results in a conviction. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,
Trial and Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at C 1
(recording 381 reversed murder convictions in which prosecutors failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence or knowingly presented false evidence); see also ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007); Bruce A. Green,
Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995) (discussing reasons for lack of professional discipline of
prosecutors); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1523-24 (1981); Frank Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79
N.C. L. REV. 721, 749-50 (2001) (discussing reasons for lack of professional discipline
of prosecutors).
84. There is extensive scholarly debate over how prosecutors can successfully navi-
gate this tricky terrain. Commentators convincingly argue that the vague, protean
nature of the "minister of justice" imperative fails to adequately guide prosecutors in the
performance of their manifold responsibilities. See Green, supra note 60, at 608
(explaining that the duty to do justice was never precisely defined and that "It]he con-
cept [is] protean as well as vague"). There is no consensus as to the obligations that
ethical rules impose upon prosecutors. See, e.g., Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to
Truth, supra note 59, at 337 (suggesting the prosecutor has "a duty to make an indepen-
dent evaluation of the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and
the truth of the defendant's guilt"); Green, supra note 60, at 635-36 (stating that prose-
cutors have "a heightened duty to ensure the fairness of the outcome of a criminal pro-
ceeding from a substantive perspective-to ensure both that innocent people are not
punished and that the guilty are not punished with undue harshness"); H. Richard Uvil-
ler, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2000) ("Neutrality ... puts the prosecutor in the position of
advocate for all the people-including the person against whom the evidence has been
accumulating.").
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dence, 8 5 which demonstrates how the Court balances crime control and
due process values in domestic criminal cases.
B. The Court's "Access to Evidence" Jurisprudence
Legal authorities often describe criminal trials as "a search for truth"
86
achieved through "vigorous adversarial testing of guilt and innocence."
87
In order to perform this truth-seeking function, both the prosecution and
the defense need to be able to develop all the relevant facts to present them
to the fact finder.8 8 However, prosecutors' relationships with law enforce-
ment agencies often give them early, comprehensive access to evidence
from an investigation. Therefore, they have the opportunity to affect the
reliability of the trial process by hindering defense access to necessary
evidence. 89
Over the course of several decades, the Supreme Court developed
"what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed
85. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (using the phrase
to describe cases in which the Court requires the prosecution to protect a defendant's
access to evidence).
86. Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the
Implications for the Criminal Justice System: Public Perception, Justice, and the "Search for
Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1267, 1271 (1996) ("We must remember that
criminal trials serve more than one purpose. The first and most obvious purpose of
criminal trials is to 'search for truth' . . . . Much of what we do before, during and even
after criminal trials is quite appropriately designed to further this 'search for truth."')
(citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949));
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031
(1975); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("[T]he central pur-
pose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence ....") (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)); Gershman, The
Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 59, at 315 n.27 ("The search for truth is generally
regarded as the touchstone for the adversary system.") (citing Delaware, 475 U.S. at 681);
Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118, 118 n.1 (1987) ("Most adversary system critiques assume that truth-
finding is the purpose of the adversary system and challenge it from that point of
view."); Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the
Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 4 UTAH L. REv. 799, 804 (1988) ("Simply stated, truth is the
sine qua non of justice. If justice is to have meaning beyond that of a hollow shibboleth,
it must reflect a wise and fair application of truth.").
87. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 191 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82
(1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
88. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709 ("The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary
system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or
by the defense.").
89. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 59, at 329 ("Because of the
prosecutor's control of the evidence, he has the ability to thwart a defendant's ability to
learn about favorable witnesses, or to locate and call such witnesses once they are
known."); see also Ellen Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jenks Witness Statements: Timing
Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 651, 703 (1999).
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access to evidence." 90 These cases represent the Court's attempt to strike
the appropriate balance between crime control and due process, between
allowing prosecutors to maintain their role as zealous advocates while giv-
ing substance to their duty to "seek justice" by requiring that they provide
defendants with access to evidence where two pre-requisites exist.9 1 First,
the evidence must be material to the defendant's case. 9 2 Second, the prose-
cution must have exclusive access to, custody of, or control over the evi-
dence.93 These two prerequisites give substance to the prosecution's duty
to ensure fair trials and to aggressively prosecute alleged criminals.
1. The Materiality Requirement
The appropriate balance between prosecutors' duties to advocate
aggressively and to aid defendants is a tricky matter. The Court resolved
this dilemma by limiting the situations in which prosecutors must
subordinate their law enforcement duty to their duty to administer jus-
tice.9 4 Prosecutors must provide defendants with access to evidence only
when that evidence is "material" to the case. 95 The materiality requirement
is set forth in two lines of cases: (1) the non-disclosure cases, where prose-
cutors fail to disclose favorable evidence, and (2) the interference cases,
where prosecutors actively interfere with defense access to evidence.
a. The Non-Disclosure Cases
The Court first articulated the materiality requirement in Brady v.
Maryland,96 the seminal case addressing prosecutors' obligations to dis-
close evidence favorable to defendants. Brady was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. 97 Although he did not deny his involvement in the
crime, he asserted that his accomplice, Boblit, actually strangled the vic-
tim.98 Prior to trial, Brady asked the prosecution to provide him with all of
Boblit's prior statements. 99 However, the prosecutor withheld Boblit's con-
fession to the actual homicide. 10 0 The Court held that the prosecutor's
failure to disclose the statement violated due process because the statement
was material. 1 1
After introducing the concept of materiality in Brady, the Court did
not define the term until twenty years later in United States v. Bagley.1
0 2
90. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
91. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (reiterating that defendants
must have a "meaningful opportunity" to defend themselves) (citing Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986)).
92. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867-68.
93. Id.
94. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
95. Id. at 87.
96. Id. at 86-88.
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 87.
102. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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However, the standard explicitly set forth in Bagley was inherent in the
Court's interim decisions. For example, nine years after Brady, the Court
explained that due process is not violated simply because undisclosed evi-
dence might have been helpful to the defense. 10 3 Rather, a new trial is
only required if the evidence could "in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury."'1 4 Four years later, the Court found
that "implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the sup-
pressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial."' 0 5 Finally,
in Bagley, the Court explicitly defined what it had only hinted at before,
holding that evidence is material if "there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."'1 6 The Court further defined a "reasonable
probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."'
10 7
Kyles v. Whitley, 108 decided years after these articulations of the mate-
riality requirement, represents the Court's most comprehensive explana-
tion of the standard. After Kyles was sentenced to death, he discovered
numerous items of evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose, includ-
ing contradictory statements made by a police informant and by eyewit-
nesses. 10 9 On appeal, the lower courts concluded that the undisclosed
evidence was not material and affirmed the conviction and sentence. 110
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the lower courts had misap-
plied the materiality standard.'1 ' The standard, the Court explained, is
neither a preponderance of the evidence nor a sufficiency of the evidence
test.11 2 The Court reasoned that these standards are too onerous and spec-
ulative. 113 Rather, the Court emphasized that the "touchstone" of the
materiality requirement is the "reasonable probability" language.11 4 The
correct question is whether the undisclosed, favorable evidence could "rea-
sonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to under-
mine confidence in the verdict.' 15 The proper inquiry focuses on whether
the defendant received a verdict worthy of confidence in the absence of the
undisclosed evidence. 1 16
Answering this question requires courts to consider the cumulative
effect of all undisclosed evidence.11 7 Of course, courts must first evaluate
103. United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
106. 473 U.S. at 682.
107. Id.
108. 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
109. Id. at 428-29.
110. Id. at 431-32.
111. Id. at 435-36, 440-41.
112. Id. at 434.
113. Id. at 434-35.
114. Id. at 434.
115. Id. at 435.
116. Id. at 434.
117. Id. at 436 & n.10.
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each piece of omitted evidence individually to determine its "tendency and
force"1 18 before weighing the cumulative effect of the undisclosed informa-
tion.119 The Court's careful parsing of the materiality standard was more
than an exercise in semantics. When the Court applied the proper stan-
dard in Kyles, it reversed the conviction concluding that "'fairness' cannot
be stretched to the point of calling [Kyles' trial] a fair trial."'120
b. The Interference Cases
In addition to cases in which the prosecution failed to disclose evi-
dence, the materiality standard also applies to cases in which prosecutors
actively interfere with defense access to evidence. In United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal,12 1 the decisive case addressing the issue of prosecutorial
interference, the defendant was charged with transporting undocumented
aliens within the United States. 122 He was arrested with three Mexican
citizens who were hiding in his car.12 3 Shortly after the arrest, the prosecu-
tor interviewed all three passengers and determined that none of them pos-
sessed information helpful to the defense. 124 One was detained in the
United States to provide evidence against Mr. Valenzuela-Bernal, 125 but the
other two were deported to Mexico. Mr. Valenzuela-Bernal moved to dis-
miss the indictment, arguing that the government violated due process
when it used its sovereign powers to place potential witnesses beyond the
court's subpoena power before giving him an opportunity for an
interview. 12
6
The Court acknowledged the prosecutor's duty to provide defendants
with access to potential witnesses because access is necessary to give the
defendant the opportunity to determine whether favorable testimony
exists. 12 7 However, the Court affirmed Valenzuela-Bernal's conviction,
because the government's duty is triggered "only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier
118. Id.
119. Id. Evidence can be material when considered collectively, even if a single piece
considered alone would not be material. Id. at 437.
120. As the Kyles Court wrote:
[C]onfidence that the verdict would have been unaffected cannot survive when
suppressed evidence would have entitled a jury to find that the eyewitnesses
were not consistent in describing the killer, that two out of the four eyewitnesses
testifying were unreliable, that the most damning physical evidence was subject
to suspicion, that the investigation that produced it was insufficiently probing,
and that the principal police witness was insufficiently informed or candid. This
is not the "massive" case envisioned by the dissent, it is a significantly weaker
case than the one heard by the first jury, which could not even reach a verdict.
Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
121. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
122. Id. at 861.
123. Id. at 860-61.
124. Id. at 861.
125. Id.
126. Id. Mr. Valenzuela-Bernal also raised an identical Sixth Amendment compulsory
process claim. Id.
127. Id. at 867.
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of fact."1 2 8 Mr. Valenzuela-Bernal's failure to demonstrate materiality was
fatal to his claim.1 29
c. Conclusion
The burden of demonstrating materiality rests with the defendant. 1 30
In the failure to disclose cases, such as Brady, courts usually make the
materiality determination after the trial's completion because that is when
the undisclosed evidence typically comes to light.13 1 In the interference
cases, such as Valenzuela-Bernal, courts make the determination prior to
trial.' 32 In such situations, the defendant must make a "plausible show-
ing" that the evidence is material.' 33
The materiality trigger protects important due process and crime con-
trol norms. First, it safeguards the integrity of the criminal process by
ensuring that defendants are able to obtain and present material evidence,
thus instilling confidence that the fact-finder had the evidence necessary to
reach a reliable verdict.' 34 Second, the materiality requirement allows
prosecutors to maintain their adversarial posture. 13 5 The "access to evi-
dence" cases do not create a constitutional right to discovery.' 36 Prosecu-
tors need not open all of their files and provide all of their evidence to
defendants. 13 7 Rather, prosecutors can act as aggressive advocates and
128. Id. at 874.
129. See id. at 861.
130. See id. at 872. In Valenzuela-Bernal, for example, the Court explained that the
defendant must make a "plausible showing" that the testimony of the deported witnesses
would have been material. Id. at 873.
131. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding, subsequent to
petitioner's initial conviction, that statements made by petitioner's companion indicat-
ing that he and not the petitioner committed the actual homicide were material to peti-
tioner's case).
132. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 858 (explaining that the federal district court
determined materiality in response to a motion to dismiss before respondent's
conviction).
133. Id. at 873.
134. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) ("The proper standard of
materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt.").
135. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1134-36 (1982) (discussing Brady
and the sporting theory of criminal justice).
136. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-60 (1987) ("A defendant's right to dis-
cover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search
through the Commonwealth's files."); Weathersford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)
("There is no general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases and Brady did
not create one."); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 ("[T]here is, of course, no duty to provide
defense counsel with unlimited discovery of everything known by the prosecutor.").
137. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). In Bagley, the Court
reiterated:
[Tihe Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not
to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-
ered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. Thus, the prose-
cutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.
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keep non-material evidence to themselves. 138 Nevertheless, prosecutors
bear the responsibility for an error in judgment as to whether evidence is
material.139 This provides incentives for prosecutors to err on the side of
disclosure and access. 140 Resting this burden on prosecutors' shoulders is
appropriate because it "justif[ies] trust in the prosecutor as 'the representa-
tive ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."' " 41
2. The Exclusivity Requirement
The second requirement that triggers the prosecutor's duty to provide
defense access to evidence is exclusivity. Exclusivity is present when the
prosecutor has exclusive access to, custody of, or control over material evi-
dence.' 42  This requirement accords "special significance to the
prosecu[tion's] obligation to serve the cause of justice" by compelling the
prosecution to provide defendants with access to evidence when those
defendants have no other means to obtain it.143
For purposes of determining whether exclusivity exists, the govern-
ment is often treated as a single entity. For example, even if a prosecutor
does not have personal knowledge of evidence that should be disclosed,
the prosecutor is deemed to have exclusive access to the evidence when
another prosecutor was aware of it 14 4 or when another institution consid-
ered an "arm" of the prosecution held it. 1 45 For these purposes, police
Id. at 675 (citations omitted); see also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) (stat-
ing that there is "no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete
and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case"); Giles
v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that an interpreta-
tion of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery "would
entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice.").
138. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 (stating that the Brady rule, by not requiring com-
plete disclosure, preserves the adversarial system that is essential to discovering truth).
139. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (stressing that although the mate-
riality standard allows prosecutors some discretion, it also imposes on them the respon-
sibility to gauge what evidence is material).
140. See id. But see Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX.
L. REv. 685, 711-15 (2006) (arguing that the materiality standard is unworkable and
easily circumvented by prosecutors).
141. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
142. See Giles, 386 U.S. at 100.
143. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 692 (1995) (holding that prose-
cutor's lack of awareness of a contract between the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Fire-
arms and prosecution's two key witnesses was irrelevant to the determination of a due
process violation). In Giglio v. United States, the Court found a due process violation
because the government failed to disclose promises of leniency that had been made by a
prior prosecutor to witnesses and of which the current prosecutor was unaware. 405
U.S. 150 (1972). When one spokesperson for the government makes a promise to a
witness or third party, the courts will impute awareness of that promise to other govern-
ment representatives. See id. at 154. According to the Court, whether the nondisclosure
results from negligence or purposeful conduct, the prosecutor's office, as the spokesman
for the government, is responsible. Id.
145. The Court's due process jurisprudence treats the government as a single entity if
it can be considered the "arm" of the prosecution. Kyles, 514 U.S. 419. In Kyles, the
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agencies and even some non-law enforcement agencies may be "arms" of
the prosecution. 146
This exclusivity requirement develops out of the non-disclosure cases
and the interference cases. In Brady, a non-disclosure case, the prosecution
had exclusive access to Boblit's confession. 14 7 The defendant could not
have discovered the confession p~ior to trial even through the exercise of
reasonable diligence. 148 The prosecution's sole custody of this material
evidence triggered its duty to disclose it. 1 4 9 Similarly, in Bagley, the prose-
cutor failed to disclose that two of its key witnesses had testified in return
for promises of reward.150 Instead, the prosecutor provided evidence that
the witnesses were not testifying pursuant to any "threats or rewards, or
promises of reward."' 5 ' After his trial and conviction, Bagley filed a Free-
dom of Information Act request.' 5 2 In response, he received contracts
between the government and the two witnesses that demonstrated that the
government had promised the witnesses payment and that the witnesses
expected to receive compensation for their testimony in Bagley's trial.' 5 3
The defendant could not have obtained these contracts prior to trial,
because the prosecution did not file them until after his conviction.' 5 4 The
court held that because the prosecutor had exclusive access to this material
evidence,' 5 5 he may have violated due process by failing to disclose it.'
5 6
prosecutor was responsible for information the police knew but did not disclose to him
because he "ha[d] a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting
on the government's behalf in this case, including the police." Id. at 437. Similarly, in
another case, a district court held the prosecutor responsible for an Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) agent's deportation of potential material witnesses. United
States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd., 194 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Neb. 2002). The failure of the INS
to become aware of favorable evidence constituted a due process violation because only
the government had access to the witnesses prior to deportation. Id. at 950.
146. See infra notes 175, 236.
147. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
148. Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1961). The confession was introduced at
Boblit's trial, which occurred after Brady's trial. Id. Brady only learned of Boblit's con-
fession after his conviction and sentence of death. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
149. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87.
150. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1985). Prior to trial, the
defense requested disclosure of any "deals, promises or inducements" made to the wit-
nesses in exchange for their testimony. Id. at 670.
151. Id. The government provided defendants with signed affidavits to that effect. Id.
152. Id. at 671.
153. See id. at 671-73.
154. See id. at 672.
155. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
156. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-84. For further discussion regarding materiality and
due process violations relating to the withholding of evidence, see Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668 (2004) (holding that because suppression of evidence by the prosecution may
have prejudiced the petitioner at trial, petitioner was not precluded from presenting a
Brady violation at the federal level merely because he failed to do so in state court); Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that because it was reasonably probable that
suppressed evidence would have affected the trial, the prosecutor's withholding of that
evidence constituted a Brady violation); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (hold-
ing that no due process violation existed because it was not a reasonable likelihood that
the jurors would misunderstand the jury instructions, as petitioner argued); Moore v.
Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1978) (holding that the prosecution's suppression of witness
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The Court found exclusive access even though the assistant attorney gen-
eral who prosecuted the respondent stipulated that he was unaware that
the contracts existed and, thus, was unable to turn them over prior to
trial. 1
5 7
In interference cases such as Valenzuela-Bernal, exclusivity again trig-
gers the prosecutor's duty to provide defendants with access to evidence.
When the potential witnesses are foreign nationals, exclusivity attaches
because the government can deport them before providing defendants with
the opportunity for an interview. In United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez,15 8
for example, the defendant was charged with crimes related to smuggling
Mexican citizens into the United States. 159 The undocumented Mexican
citizens were held in government custody, 160 but the government deported
them before Mendez-Rodriguez was even aware that they had been in cus-
tody. 16 1 Mendez-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment,' 62 arguing
that the government violates due process when it places potential witnesses
beyond the reach of the court's subpoena power. 163 The Court agreed. 16 4
The government's sole control over the potential witnesses triggered its
duty to provide defense access to these individuals. 165
Similarly, in United States v. Hernandez,166 an alien witnessed a fight
between the defendant and a border patrol agent.167 The government
knew that the witness likely possessed information favorable to the defen-
dant,168 yet proceeded to deport the witness. 169 The court held that the
government violated due process because it had sole access to this poten-
tially favorable defense witness, but deported her without giving any notice
to the defendant, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to interview
her. 170
Generally, prosecutors do not have exclusive access to evidence as
long as defendants can obtain the evidence through the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence.' 7 1 The exclusivity requirement thus preserves the adver-
statement misidentifying defendant was not a violation of the Brady rule); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that the prosecutor's failure to disclose that
he had promised witnesses that they would not be prosecuted if they testified would
violate due process if it would have affected the jury with any reasonable likelihood).
157. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 672 n.4.
158. 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id. at 2.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id.
165. The Court held that the fundamental fairness required by due process mandated
that the prosecution not frustrate a defendant's ability to prepare for trial. Id.
166. 347 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
167. Id. at 384.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 386.
170. Id.
171. For examples of failures to exercise reasonable diligence in non-disclosure cases,
see United States v. Perez, 473 F.3d 1147, 1150 (11th Cir. 2006) (no Brady violation
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sarial system by requiring each party to conduct its own fact-finding. 17 2
The prosecution must provide access only when defendants cannot obtain
material evidence through the exercise of reasonable diligence, because the
prosecution's access in such cases is truly exclusive. 173 In contrast, when
both parties have access to the same evidence, each can appropriately
maintain its adversarial posture, choosing not to aid the other. 174
3. The Special Bad Faith Requirement
The underlying purpose for protecting access to evidence is not to
punish prosecutorial "misdeeds"'17 5 but to ensure that trials are fair and
when defendant could obtain evidence through exercise of reasonable diligence); United
States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2002) (no Brady violation if evidence is other-
wise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence); Kutzner v.
Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2002) (no Brady violation when defendant could obtain
evidence through exercise of reasonable diligence); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d
911, 918 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew, or
should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any excul-
patory evidence.") (citing United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982));
United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 1990) (no Brady violation when
"defendant was aware of the essential facts that would enable him to take advantage of
the exculpatory evidence."); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991)
(When "a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed Brady
material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.") (citations omitted);
United States v. Hicks, 848 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (no Brady violation because defense
had access to the evidence); DeBerry v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1975) (no
Brady violation if evidence is otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise
of reasonable diligence); United States v. Ringwah, 213 F. Supp. 2d 499, 517 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (prosecution did not suppress evidence when the defense already knew of the
existence of the evidence). In most of these disclosure cases, the defendant, however,
had no knowledge of the existence of the exculpatory evidence and, thus, no way of
attempting to obtain it. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ("In
many cases, however, exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may
be unknown to defense counsel."); Hernandez, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 386. For examples in
the interference cases, see United States v. Favela-Favela, 41 Fed. App'x 185, 194 (10th
Cir. 2002) (defendant waived his right of access by declining to interview potential wit-
nesses prior to deportation); United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d 1266, 1269
(5th Cir. 1980) (defendant could have sought a postponement of deportation if he deter-
mined that he had insufficient time to interview deportable witnesses); United States v.
Lujan-Castro, 602 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant waived his right to retain
deportable witnesses in the country).
172. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (duty to provide access "is not
[meant] to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-
ered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.").
173. Only some courts require that the defendant exercise reasonable diligence. See
supra note 171.
174. Prosecutors "are under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they
learn about the case and about their witnesses." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109 (citing In re
Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 569 (1963)).
175. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence
or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney
must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958); Am. BAR ASS'N, supra note 63, § 11-2.1(d). "To the extent
this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be
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legitimate.' 7 6 This distinction is important because the good or bad faith
of the prosecutor is usually irrelevant to the fairness of the trial.
17 7
Whether acting in good or bad faith, the prosecutor's failure to provide
access deprives the jury of evidence that could affect its verdict, 178 result-
ing in "a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process."'
1 7 9
Nonetheless, there are rare instances when the prosecutor's motive
may be important. Motive may matter in cases where the government is
faced with conflicting sovereign obligations, such as when the government
is acting in its sovereign capacity to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed"'180 by prosecuting criminals and is also performing another sov-
ereign function, such as regulating immigration. When the government
faces conflicting duties, its conduct should not be "judged by standards
which might be appropriate if the Government's only responsibility were to
prosecute criminal offenses."' 8 '
Valenzuela-Bernal, in which the government juggled two sovereign
roles, provides an example of this conflict. 18 2 On the one hand, the gov-
ernment had to faithfully carry out the laws by investigating and prosecut-
ing criminals.' 8 3 This role required the government to provide defendants
with access to material evidence.' 8 4 On the other hand, the government
also had to regulate immigration by promptly deporting illegal aliens.
18 5
When the government must satisfy two sovereign obligations that may be
established to carry that burden and to insure communication of all relevant informa-
tion on each case to every lawyer who deals with it." Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
176. As the Brady Court so eloquently wrote: "The principle.., is not punishment of
society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."
373 U.S. at 87; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 ("We are dealing with the defendant's
right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.").
177. The Court affirmed this principle in Agurs, in which the Court wrote, "If the
suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of
the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." 427 U.S. at 110. The Agurs Court
noted that a prosecutor is the "servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer." Id. at 111 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935)).
178. Id. at 110.
179. Id. at 104. In Napue v. Illinois, the prosecution failed to correct testimony it
knew to be false. 360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959). This action violated due process because
the result was a "tainted conviction." Id. at 269. The prosecutor's failure to act deprived
the jury of the ability to evaluate all of the facts, not just the version that the prosecution
presented. See id. at 270. The good or bad faith of the prosecutor "matter[ed] little, for
its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be
termed fair." Id.
180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
181. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866 (1982).
182. See id. at 864.
183. See id. at 863.
184. See id. at 867.
185. Id. at 864. The Constitution delegates the regulation of immigration to Con-
gress. Id.
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in conflict, 18 6 its motive for interfering with defendants' access to evidence
may be relevant.18 7 In sum, when the government is acting solely in the
role of advocate, its good or bad faith in failing to disclose material evi-
dence is irrelevant, but when it must balance potentially conflicting sover-
eign obligations, the defendant may be required to demonstrate that the
government's interference with his or her access to material evidence was
done in bad faith.' 8 8
4. Guiding Principles
The U.S. Supreme Court's "access to evidence" jurisprudence demon-
strates how the domestic compulsory process model balances important
186. See id. The dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of these
demands as in conflict. Id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court stated:
[TIhe responsibility of the Executive Branch faithfully to execute the immigra-
tion policy adopted by Congress justifies the prompt deportation of illegal-alien
witnesses upon the Executive's good-faith determination that they possess no
evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution. The mere fact
that the Government deports such witnesses is not sufficient to establish a viola-
tion of the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A violation of these provisions requires
some showing that the evidence lost would be both material and favorable to the
defense.
Id. at 872-73; see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Some lower courts have interpreted this language to
mean that defendants must demonstrate bad faith. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 136
Fed. App'x. 55 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant failed to show either bad faith or materiality);
United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2000) (government did not
act in bad faith); United States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd., 194 F. Supp. 2d 949, 957 (D. Neb.
2002) ("While not explicitly required by Valenzuela-Bernal, some circuits have required
that defendants also prove that the government's removal action was a result of 'bad
faith.').
Examples of bad faith that produce a due process violation include the government's
deportation of potential witnesses that either departs from normal procedure or that is
done to gain an unfair tactical advantage. United States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d
1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Smith, 136 Fed. App'x. 55, 58 (9th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Ramirez-Cubillas, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1057 (D. Neb.
2002). This type of action implicitly demonstrates some awareness of the favorable
nature of the testimony.
188. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51. Commentators have critiqued this "bad faith" stan-
dard, arguing that it creates an insurmountable barrier for defendants attempting to
establish a due process violation. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Bawden, Here Today, Gone
Tomorrow- Three Common Mistakes Courts Make When Police Lose or Destroy Evidence
with Apparent Exculpatory Value, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 349 (2000); Keith A. Findley,
New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of DNA, 75 Wis. LAW., May 2002, at 20, 20;
Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evi-
dence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2005); Mat-
thew H. Lembke, The Role of Police Culpability in Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L. REV.
1213, 1237-41 (1990); Lucy S. McGough, Good Enough for Government Work: The Con-
stitutional Duty to Preserve Forensic Interviews of Child Victims, 65 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 179, 197-99 (2002). Some state courts have rejected the Supreme Court's bad
faith requirement. Lembke, supra, at 1241; see also Daniel R. Dinger, Should Lost Evi-
dence Mean a Lost Chance to Prosecute?: State Rejections of the United States Supreme
Court Decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 353 (2000) (describing
Tennessee's reasoning for its rejection of the bad faith test).
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crime control and due process norms by creating a prosecutorial duty to
provide defendants with access to material evidence over which prosecu-
tors have exclusive power, custody, or control. The materiality and exclu-
sivity requirements demonstrate the Court's attempt to appropriately
balance the prosecutor's quasi-judicial and adversarial roles in domestic
cases.
III. The Proposed Transnational Framework
A. The Problem
Defendants are unable to compel retrieval of evidence from foreign
jurisdictions using MLATs.' 8 9 As a result, accused individuals needing for-
eign evidence are at the mercy of prosecutors. 190 Although prosecutors
could request defense evidence from foreign locales, they do not feel com-
pelled to do so. 19 ' Instead, they assert that they can decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to do so voluntarily,19 2 even in the face of a court order.
It is their position that a "court ... lack[s] the power or authority to compel
the Government to make a request for the benefit of the defense over the
objection of the prosecution."'19 3 Ultimately, the government's position is
189. See supra Part I.
190. Id. Defendants' access to material evidence should not be held hostage by the
good graces of the prosecution. Prosecutors are not immune from the pressures of trial
and the desire to win that comes along with it. After all, prosecutors are advocates. In
hotly contested cases, for example, it is more likely that the prosecution will determine
that a defense request for evidence is without merit. In some cases, prosecutors have
hidden physical evidence and buried statements inconsistent with their theory of guilt.
See Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 64, at 299. In one case, for example, the prosecution
failed to disclose a statement from an eyewitness (the victim's brother) saying that the
killers were white, when the prosecution was prosecuting a black man for the crime. Id.
at 297. If some prosecutors will go this far in their zeal to win, there can be no question
that other prosecutors will decide not to use an MLAT on behalf of a defendant in order
to place themselves at an advantage during the trial. It is in hotly contested cases, where
the defense's ability to rebut the prosecution's case with its own evidence could make
the difference between conviction and acquittal, that the prosecution will most likely
refuse to voluntarily utilize an MLAT on behalf of the defense. For example, defendants
can not rely upon prosecutors to disclose material exculpatory evidence of their own
volition, see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or to disclose witness perjury,
see, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
191. CAYMAN ISLANDs REPORT, supra note 27, at 273. According to an executive offi-
cial, "Nothing in the proposed treaties would preclude the Department of Justice from
making MLAT requests on behalf of prosecutors who wish to pursue claims raised by
the defense .... [Ilt would not be accurate to describe this process as making a request
on behalf of a criminal defendant." Id.
192. They have done just that. For example, in United States v. Des Marteau, 162
F.R.D. 364, 366-67 (M.D. Fla. 1995), the prosecutors expressed their willingness to use
the MLAT with Canada to facilitate a deposition.
193. Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties, and Treaties Relating to Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT): Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 102d
Cong. 40 (1992) (statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of
State). In the face of a court order, the government will "evaluate such a prospective
order, reserving its rights to oppose issuance or appeal issuance, and, if it lost such an
appeal, to weigh the consequences of non-compliance." CAYMAN ISLANDs REPORT, supra
note 27, at 273; see also ABBELL & RiSTAU, supra note 15, at 28 n.13 ("The Department of
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that
it is not "improper" for MLATs to provide assistance for prosecutors and
investigators, not defense counsel, any more than it would be improper for
the FBI to conduct investigations for prosecutors and rot for defendants.
The Government has the job of assembling evidence to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, so it must have the tools to do so. The defense does not
have the same job, and therefore does not require the same tools. 194
The government's position reflects its misunderstanding of the prose-
cutor's constitutionally mandated dual role in criminal trials. Although the
government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it nonetheless has
a corresponding duty to ensure that criminal processes operate fairly.
When the government has exclusive access to and control over material
evidence, its constitutional duty to ensure fairness requires it to provide
defendants with access to such evidence. 195 Viewed in light of the
Supreme Court's domestic compulsory process framework, the current
adjudication of transnational criminal cases fails to adequately balance
crime control and due process norms. The government's position, while
consistent with its role as law enforcer, runs counter to its due process
obligation to promote accuracy and fairness. Although the government
views a request for defense evidence as being discretionary, 19 6 it is not.
The problem of unequal access to foreign evidence requires a solution
if transnational criminal trials in the United States are to comport with due
process standards of fairness and reliability. These requirements of due
process are not simply aspirational; they are fundamental to maintaining
public confidence and integrity in the criminal justice system.
This Part proposes a transnational compulsory process framework
that builds upon the domestic process approach. Like the domestic
approach, the proposed framework balances the crime control and due pro-
cess norms. The framework accords "special significance" 19 7 to the gov-
Justice, however, has continued to maintain that the restrictive language in the more
recent mutual assistance treaties in criminal matters gives it veto power over whether the
United States will make a court-ordered treaty request on behalf of a defendant.").
194. AUSTRIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 10.
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. The government incorrectly views a request for defense evidence under an
MLAT as being discretionary because it is on behalf of a defendant. Such a request is
mandatory, however, not because it is on behalf of a defendant but rather because it is
on behalf of the government. The prosecutor's duty as a representative of the sovereign
requires him or her to obtain evidence that furthers the search for truth:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as
those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not
understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is per-
haps the best protection against the abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies
in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and
not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches
his task with humility.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the Second Annual
Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6 (1940).
197. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976).
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ernment's duty to ensure fair trials by requiring prosecutors to obtain
material defense evidence from foreign nations utilizing the MLAT. The
proposed model will protect the adversarial system yet preserve the legiti-
macy of and public confidence in the outcomes of transnational criminal
cases.
B. The Framework
The following rules should govern situations in which defendants
require foreign evidence:
When the government has exclusive access to, custody of or control over
material defense evidence, it must provide defendants with access to it. Evi-
dence is material if there is a reasonable probability that it can affect the judg-
ment of the trier of fact. 198 A "reasonable probability" is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.19 9
Defendants must make a "plausible showing"20 0 that the requested evi-
dence is material before the government will be required to provide access.
Defendants are not required to demonstrate bad faith.
This framework balances important criminal process norms. First,
vigorous prosecutorial advocacy is appropriate and desirable under the
framework. The framework preserves this aspect of the crime control
model by importing the materiality and exclusivity requirements from the
domestic compulsory process framework. Second, the foreign evidence-
gathering framework safeguards the legitimacy of the criminal process.
Under it, existing MLATs remain intact, but their use will be expanded to
allow both prosecutors and defendants to present material evidence to the
fact-finder. By ensuring that parties are able to present all material evi-
dence, the public can have confidence in the reliability of the system's
outcomes.
C. Application
Applying the framework to transnational criminal cases demonstrates
that when prosecutors have exclusive access to material evidence that the
defendant requests, they must utilize existing MLATs to obtain that
evidence.
1. Materiality
First, defendants must make a plausible showing that the foreign evi-
dence they require is material. Courts are very familiar with the material-
ity standard: evidence is material if there can be no confidence that the
decisionmaker would reach a reliable verdict in the absence of the admissi-
ble evidence. 20 1 In making this determination, courts must evaluate the
198. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1982).
199. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
200. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867.
201. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
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cumulative effect of the requested evidence. 20 2 Of course, a defendant may
be unable to articulate precisely what information a requested document
contains or exactly what a foreign witness will say if the defendant has
neither seen the document nor interviewed the witness. Courts should
take this into account when determining whether the defendant has made
a plausible showing of materiality. It should be sufficient for the defendant
to postulate the events to which the witness might testify and to demon-
strate how those events relate to the crime charged.
There is precedent for this relaxed materiality standard. In Valenzuela-
Bernal, the Court recognized that defendants may have difficulty making a
"plausible showing of materiality" 20 3 without the opportunity to interview
witnesses prior to their deportation. 20 4 The Court acknowledged that it
would be impossible for a defendant "to make any avowal of how a witness
may testify" when the government's conduct places evidence beyond the
defendant's reach. 20 5 "[A] defendant cannot be expected to render a
detailed description" of the "lost" evidence." 20 6 Instead, the defendant can
demonstrate materiality by setting forth "the events to which a witness
might testify, and the relevance of those events to the crime charged
"207
2. Exclusivity
Second, upon finding materiality, the court must determine whether
the defendant can obtain the evidence through the exercise of reasonable
diligence without government aid. Defendants usually cannot obtain mate-
rial foreign evidence through the exercise of reasonable diligence, because
the only means available to them, the letters rogatory procedure, is simply
too unreliable. 20 8 There is no guarantee that the procedure will result in
the provision of evidence, that the evidence will arrive in time for the trial,
or that it will be admissible.20 9 Given the realities of the letters rogatory
202. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
203. 458 U.S. at 871.
204. Id. at 870.
205. Id. at 870-73.
206. Id. at 873.
207. Id. at 871; see also United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1982). In Steele,
the defense argued that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the government
to take deposition testimony of witnesses located in Bermuda for use at trial because the
government had not established materiality. Steele, 685 F.2d at 798. In finding that the
required showing of materiality had been met, the Third Circuit wrote:
[U]nder the extremely unusual circumstances of this case it could not insist on
the usual showing of materiality. In the ordinary case, where the witnesses
reside in the United States, the witness who will be unavailable for trial will be
available sometime prior to the deposition so that the parties will know with
reasonable certainty the materiality of the proposed testimony. We believe that
the district court appropriately accepted the reduced showing of materiality to
avoid denying important evidence to all the parties, including the appellants, the
court, and the jury.
Id. at 809.
208. See supra Part l.B.
209. See supra Part I.B.
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process, courts should not require defendants to utilize that procedure in
order to prove that they have exercised reasonable diligence. When defend-
ants can obtain foreign evidence through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, however, they must do so. 2 10 For example, if the defendant can
access his own bank records from a foreign country, then he should not
complain that the government did not request the evidence for him by way
of an MLAT.
Third, the court must determine whether the prosecution has exclu-
sive access to the requested evidence. This standard is met automatically
whenever an MLAT exists, because only the government has the power to
request evidence under the treaty, with which the foreign state must com-
ply.2 11 The only exception to this general rule is when the treaty explicitly
prohibits provision of the type of information requested or when the defen-
dant can obtain the evidence through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
3. Bad Faith
Finally, a defendant should not be required to demonstrate bad faith
on the part of the government. In other words, defendants should not have
to demonstrate that the government is at fault for their inability to access
foreign evidence. An exception should be made only when the government
faces conflicting sovereign obligations.2 1 2 In the run-of-the-mill transna-
tional criminal case, however, the government, by prosecuting alleged law-
breakers, is simply "tak[ing] care" that the laws are "faithfully executed."
In such cases, due process does not require defendants to demonstrate bad
faith.2 1
3
Even if the framework requires a showing of bad faith, the defense can
easily meet that standard. Federal prosecutors continue to play a central
role in the negotiation of MLATs. 2 14 The government negotiated MLATs
specifically because prosecutors could not otherwise reliably obtain for-
eign evidence.2 15 At first, the government did not exclude defendants from
operation of such treaties. 21 6 After a defendant successfully obtained for-
eign evidence utilizing an MLAT, however, the government negotiated lan-
guage in the treaties preventing defense access.2 1 7  This intentional
210. Thus, the prosecutors were partly correct when they testified that defendants
"frequently ha[ve] far greater access to evidence abroad than does the Government, since
it is [the defendants who] chose to utilize foreign institutions in the first place." AUSTRIA
REPORT, supra note 33, at 10-11. This assertion only makes sense if one assumes that
the defendant is guilty or if innocent, that the defendant did not destroy evidence of
innocence that he or she may have had in his or her possession or control at one point.
Otherwise, the defendant faces the same difficulties in gathering foreign evidence that
propelled the government to negotiate MLATs for itself.
211. See supra Part I.C.
212. See supra Part ll.B.3.
213. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 3.
214. See NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 324.
215. See id. at 321-24.
216. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
217. See NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 380-81.
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creation of the disparity in access to process should be sufficient to demon-
strate bad faith.
Defendants' exclusion from the benefits of MLATs appears calculated
to give the government a tactical advantage at trial. First, the government
has never asserted that any treaty partner required the exclusion. Instead,
an executive official admitted that "there was no discussion of how our
treaty partners would react to receiving MLAT requests by or on behalf of
criminal defendants" among the negotiators. 2 18 Second, in testimony
before the Senate during the advice and consent process, the government
admitted that it intended MLATs to provide benefits solely for the govern-
ment.219 Third, drafters added the restrictive language to the treaty only
after a defendant successfully requested evidence pursuant to an MLAT
that did not contain the exclusionary language. 2 20 When the government
takes action solely to gain a tactical advantage at trial, bad faith is
presumed. 22 1
4. Foreign Policy Implications
MLATs are indispensable tools for gathering evidence in transnational
adjudications. Hence, the goal of the proposed framework is to maintain
their efficacy while simultaneously balancing due process and crime con-
trol norms. However, this framework will compromise crime control
norms if foreign nations that are parties to MLATs with the United States
do not respond favorably to requests by the U.S. central authority for evi-
dence that is material to the defense. Courts will likely dismiss such a
criminal case for lack of evidence, allowing a potentially guilty defendant
to go free. Additionally, this situation would force the government to con-
sider renegotiating all existing MLATs to explicitly protect compulsion par-
ity, a daunting task with serious foreign policy implications. Thus, it is
necessary to determine the likelihood that foreign nations will respond
favorably to requests for material defense evidence. This requires a brief
summary of the differences between common law and civil law criminal
justice systems.
Although the United States is a common law jurisdiction, many
nations that are signatories to MLATs with the United States are civil law
jurisdictions. 22 2 Both systems are designed to determine the "truth" in
218. CAYMAN ISLANDS REPORT, supra note 27, at 274.
219. See supra note 51.
220. See NADELMANN, supra note 3, at 380-81.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 136 Fed. App'x. 55 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Ramirez-Cubillas, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Neb. 2002).
222. In 2003, countries following the civil law system represented 33.8% of the
world's jurisdictions while those following the common law system represented 28.24%.
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3
(2003). Countries with civil law systems include Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, as well as Latin American countries and Scandi-
navian countries. Mary C. Daly, Legal Ethics: Some Thoughts on the Differences in Crimi-
nal Trials in the Civil and Common Law Legal Systems, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 65
(1999); Felicity Nagorcka et al., Stranded Between Partisanship and the Truth? A Compara-
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criminal cases, but they utilize different processes to do so. In common
law systems, two opposing parties investigate the facts and argue their side
of the controversy to a neutral fact-finder. 223 In this adversarial system, the
truth is expected to emerge from this clash of opponents. 224 Although the
systems in civil law countries are by no means homogeneous, there is gen-
erally little distinction between defense evidence and prosecution evidence.
Scholars frequently refer to civil law systems as "non-adversary" or "inquis-
itorial" systems, because a disinterested official, either the judge or the
prosecutor, conducts the investigation. 22 5 Although it may be difficult to
believe that a prosecutor has no stake in the outcome, in civil law systems
the prosecutor is a civil servant who is isolated from political pressures. 226
[In the civil tradition, the prosecutor] is not seen as a party but rather as
another official or magistrate of the state whose role is to determine the
truth. There is a sort of division of labor between the prosecutor and the
judge: the first requests the investigation of facts, production of evidence,
and the application of the law, while the second investigates, produces the
evidence, and applies the law. But both are essentially the same: impartial
officials of the state whose role is to investigate the truth .... There is no
private investigator for the defense because there is only one official investi-
gation, conducted by the judge, the prosecutor, and the police. If the
defense wants certain evidence to be produced, it must request this evidence
from the prosecutor or the judge.22 7
Whether a civil law jurisdiction utilizes the investigating judge or a
prosecutor to conduct the pre-trial investigation, their responsibilities are
to investigate and discover all of the relevant facts, regardless of whether
those facts indicate innocence or guilt.2 28 The defendant can suggest lines
of investigation, and these government officials cannot refuse without stat-
ing reasons. 229 The state places the investigation in the hands of impartial
tive Analysis of Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice, 29 MELB.
U. L. REV. 448, 455, 456 (2005). The European Union follows the civil law system. Id.
223. Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARw. INT'L LJ.
1, 20 (2004).
224. Nagorcka et al., supra note 222, at 462 ("The adversarial system trusts the parties
to properly and honestly present their side of the argument, and expects that the truth
will emerge from robust presentation of each side's case.").
225. See, e.g., Gregory A. McClelland, A Non-Adversary Approach to International
Criminal Tribunals, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 11-14 (2002); William T. Pizzi,
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 1325, 1331-33 (1999);
see also Micah S. Myers, Note, Prosecuting Human Rights Violations in Europe and
America: How Legal System Structure Affects Compliance with International Obligations, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 249 (2003).
226. Pizzi, supra note 225, at 1331-33. Some scholars question whether judges in
the civil law system really exercise control over the investigation. See generally, Abraham
S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE LJ. 240 (1977).
227. Langer, supra note 223, at 24.
228. See Nagorcka et al., supra note 222, at 455-56; Franklin Strier, Making Jury Tri-
als More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 95, 146 (1996).
229. Strier, supra note 228, at 143-44.
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government officials who it expects to discover the facts objectively. 230
One commentator describes the investigatory process of the civil tradition
as follows: "[Tihere is only one pre-trial investigation, the official one; at
trial, there is no case for the prosecution or the defense, only the case of the
court . ",231
These differences between common law and civil law jurisdictions
explain why most signatories to MLATs with the United States will not balk
at responding to evidentiary requests for material defense evidence. It is
unlikely that these countries will look askance at the request because in
their own systems, the distinction between "defense" and "prosecution" evi-
dence does not exist as it does in the United States. As long as the evi-
dence that the U.S. central authority requests is relevant and material to the
investigation, foreign nations are unlikely to object.
5. Advantages and Disadvantages
This transnational due process framework offers many advantages.
First, and most importantly, existing MLATs remain viable tools for gather-
ing foreign evidence. 23 2 Under the proposed framework, defendants can
reap the benefits of transnational compulsory process to obtain and pre-
sent material evidence to the fact-finder. Thus, the model enhances the
fairness and reliability of transnational criminal trials, instilling public
confidence in the outcome. The model also facilitates effective crime con-
trol because it does not interfere with prosecutors' use of the MLATs for
their own purposes. Second, the proposed approach imports due process
principles that are well established and already employed in domestic
cases. The courts' and the parties' intimate familiarity with the ideas that
the framework proposes will ease application.2 3
3
The major potential limitation of the proposed framework is its use of
the materiality standard, which some commentators have soundly criti-
cized.23 4 Perhaps it is appropriate to question the wisdom of importing
this problematic standard into transnational due process jurisprudence.
Given the willingness of courts to continue using the materiality standard
in domestic doctrine, however, it is unlikely that courts will adopt a differ-
ent standard in the transnational context. If and when the domestic frame-
work changes, then similar changes should be made concomitantly to the
transnational approach.
Courts will also have to grapple with the question of how to respond if
a foreign nation refuses to provide defense evidence in response to a gov-
ernment request. Should this occur, the court will have to determine
230. Nagorcka et al., supra note 222, at 455, 462.
231. Langer, supra note 223, at 23 (citations omitted).
232. The disparity in access to process also raises Sixth Amendment Compulsory
Process Clause concerns. See generally Lyman, supra note 5.
233. See id. (discussing the importance of resource allocation).
234. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Essay: Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages:
The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 643 (2002) (critiquing Brady and
the materiality standard).
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whether dismissal is the appropriate remedy. Dismissal may be appropri-
ate because the government is arguably at fault for creating treaties that
preclude defense access and should bear the corresponding burden. Hold-
ing the government responsible for the foreign nation's refusal to provide
material defense evidence is consistent with the principles underlying the
Court's "access to evidence" jurisprudence. 23 5 The government should not
benefit from its actions that place defendants' due process rights in peril.
Because the government is treated as a single entity, 236 it is consistent with
the domestic due process doctrine to give the defendant the benefit of this
contingency. It does not matter that the individual prosecutor was not
directly responsible for negotiating the exclusionary language; the fact that
government action placed the evidence beyond the court's subpoena power
is sufficient.
Fortunately, this is an unlikely scenario. First, as discussed above,
civil law jurisdictions are unlikely to object.2 3 7 Second, the treaties create
mandatory obligations amongst the signatories to provide evidence in
response to a proper request by a central authority. As long as the central
authority makes the request, nations can deny assistance only if the basis
for the denial is explicitly set forth in the treaty. For example, the treaties
allow nations to deny requests that appear to involve military or political
offenses that the criminal laws of the requested state do not recognize. 238
No MLAT provides a basis for refusing a proper central authority request
simply because the requested evidence is material defense evidence. 23 9
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. The court's due process jurisprudence treats the government as a single entity
when it acts as the "arm" of the prosecution. For example, in Kyles v. Whitley, the Court
held the prosecutor responsible for information that the police knew but did not dis-
close to the prosecution. 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995). The prosecutor had exclusive
access to the information because he "has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the
police." Id. The government's duty to ensure fair trials requires it to become aware of
any exculpatory evidence that is under the government's control, even if an individual
prosecutor is not aware of it. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
(prosecutor's lack of awareness of contract between the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and
Firearms and two key witnesses irrelevant to the determination of a due process viola-
tion); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (violation of due process because of
the government's failure to disclose promises of leniency that had been made by a prior
prosecutor and of which the current prosecutor was unaware); United States v. Nebraska
Beef, Ltd., 194 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Neb. 2002) (finding prosecutor responsible for INS
agent's deportation of potential material witnesses and determining that the INS's fail-
ure to become aware of favorable evidence constituted a due process violation because
only the government had access to the witnesses prior to deportation).
237. See supra Part III.C.4.
238. See, e.g., Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters art. 9, May 23, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-25 (1997),
O.A.S. T.S. No. 75 (allowing signatories to refuse assistance if the request relates to a
political crime or harms security interests); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 476 cmts. f-g (1987) (noting that states "extradite military personnel only for com-
mon crimes, not for purely military offenses" and that the political offense exclusion "is
contained in virtually all extradition treaties").
239. See, e.g., Organization of American States, supra note 238, art. 2 ("This conven-
tion does not authorize any state party to undertake, in the territory of another state
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None of the treaties differentiate between evidence that the prosecution
requires and that which the defendant requires. In fact, the United States
has acknowledged that it "would expect the foreign government to treat the
request [for favorable defense evidence] like any other MLAT request made
by the United States."
240
Conclusion
Courts should adopt the transnational process framework that this
article proposes in order to resolve the imbalance between crime control
and due process norms that currently exists in transnational adjudica-
tions. 24 1 The framework effectively balances the state's interest in crime
control with society's interest in ensuring that criminal trials are legiti-
mate-that they are fair and will lead to reliable outcomes. It requires pros-
ecutors to ensure defense access to foreign evidence that is material to guilt
or punishment when an MLAT exists. Although the government has
argued that using MLAT treaties to request defense evidence would deter
nations from entering into such MLAT treaties,2 42 the government need
not negotiate these treaties at all. If it chooses to do so, however, the treaty
cannot violate the Constitution. 24 3 A treaty that does not comply with due
process principles can not exist.
The proposal brings due process norms into the transnational crimi-
nal process in a manner that is familiar to the courts and the parties. It
allows MLATs to remain in force, while discouraging the negotiation of
future MLATs that exclude defense access. 24 4 In sum, the framework cre-
party, the exercise of jurisdiction or the performance of functions that are placed within
the exclusive purview of the authorities of that other party by domestic law."). Domestic
law governs the decision to request information through an MLAT; therefore, once a
state actor invokes an MLAT, the foreign nation may not refuse to comply simply
because the defendant will benefit from the request.
240. CAYMAN ISLANDs REPORT, supra note 27, at 274. There have also been situations
where the prosecution has volunteered to utilize the MLAT to obtain defense evidence
and the foreign nation has not complained. For example, in one case the Office of Inter-
national Affairs indicated that it would be appropriate to utilize the U.S.-Canadian
MLAT to take testimony of defense witnesses abroad, despite the existence of language
barring private parties' use of the treaty. United States v. Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D. 364,
372 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
241. For a discussion of why courts are the appropriate institution for resolving the
disparity in access to process in transnational criminal cases, see L. Song Richardson,
Convicting the Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A Comparative Institutional Anal-
ysis Approach to the Problem, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 62 (2008).
242. See, e.g., AUSTRIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 10. Ironically, at the time the govern-
ment made this statement, one of the treaties it referenced, the treaty with Austria,
expressly provided foreign defendants with the ability to obtain evidence from the
United States. Id. at 14 ("The Austrian delegation indicated that under its legal system,
courts are required to seek evidence to assist defense counsel as well as prosecutors.
The Austrian Central Authority therefore will make such requests to the United States
under the Treaty.").
243. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
244. In fact, applying this framework will likely result in the negotiation of MLATs
which explicitly require foreign nations to respond to a government request for material
defense evidence. Negotiating explicit language into future MLATs will provide the gov-
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ates compulsory process rights in transnational cases that are consistent
with domestic protections, producing a transnational system that more ade-
quately protects fairness and accuracy.
ernment with certainty that foreign nations will not balk at receiving a request for evi-
dence that a defendant needs.
